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Abstract
The ActiveSync protocol’s implementation on some embedded devices leaves clients vulnerable to
unauthorised remote policy enforcement. This paper discusses a proof of concept attack against the
implementation of ActiveSync in common Smart phones including Android devices and iOS devices. A
two‐phase approach to exploiting the ActiveSync protocol is introduced. Phase 1 details the usage of a
man‐in‐the‐middle attack to gain a vantage point over the client device, whilst Phase 2 involves spoofing
the server‐side ActiveSync responses to initiate the unauthorised policy enforcement. These
vulnerabilities are demonstrated by experiment, highlighting how the system can be exploited to perform
a remote factory reset upon an Exchange‐integrated Smart phone.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of mobile phones is continuing to increase, while they concurrently become interconnected
mobile computing devices with ever increasing computing power. Initially, this domain was the domicile
of limited phone services on limited handset devices, with limited data speed and connectivity (Li and
Lyons 2012). These devices evolved into Smartphones, which are effectively handheld computers which
are also able to make phone calls. The latest progression in the evolution of the mobile phone is the
development of the tablet, which incorporates general computing power, data storage and widespread
network access methods (Lee, Suh et al. 2012). The networks used by Smart phones now encompass a
wide range of technologies and capabilities available for use in mobile, commodity networked devices.
The protocols themselves are diverse and in constant flux, with significant change over time as both
technology and services have evolved (Clarke 2013). Service is no longer restricted to voice and SMS but
includes not only data and Internet services but also accurate geo‐locational services using the GPS
networks, wireless networks and phone cell towers. The current generation of smart phones have
considerable computation, multimedia applications and have increasingly accurate locational services
(Poslad 2011).
The Smart phone’s ubiquity and increasing capabilities has seen them become repositories, often
singular, for our highly personal and private information. As of June 2012, over 48% of Australians
accessed the Internet using a mobile wireless connection (ABS 2012), and email was one of the most
heavily utilised services. Corporate users regularly synchronise a range of corporate data to their Smart
phone’s (Ferrer, Camacho‐Martinez et al. 2013), and again email would be the most frequent of the data
accessed, corporate email data often contains sensitive or otherwise valuable information for attackers.
These factors make the Smartphone an attractive target for attackers (Wang, Streff et al. 2012). The
Smartphone market is dominated by Android based devices, with a significant number of iPhones also
being used for corporate data. The use of Blackberry phones and Smartphones has decreased
dramatically, although it was the phone of choice for those requiring secure communications (Carton
2008). The increase in production of malcode for Android Smartphone’s has almost been geometric,
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with one report indicaating that in the
t third quaarter of 2012
2, 51447 uniq
que samples were
w
detecteed, up
from 5033
3 in the previious quarter (F‐Secure 201
12). Apple’s iO
OS has not seeen the samee level of malicious
code targgeting as And
droid devicess, but noneth
heless jail brroken Apple iOS devices are also prone to
infection (F‐Secure 201
12).
This papeer outlines a proven attack method that exploits a vulnerabilityy in certain im
mplementatio
ons of
the ActiveeSync protoco
ol. ActiveSyncc is a trusted protocol to exchange
e
maail between devices and seervers
participatting in Microssoft Exchangee environmen
nts. Microsofft Exchange has
h unique reelationship with its
clients. Th
hrough the ActiveSync
A
protocol variou
us messages are exchangeed between the parties. These
T
messagess can include control messsages, policy messages,
m
an
nd many otheer functions that enable vaarious
Exchange services. As an example,, policy messsages may bee issued from
m a server to enforce passscode
restriction
ns on a clien
nt device. Thee exploit exp
plored in thiss paper focusses upon issuing unautho
orised
policy meessages to MSS Exchange clients. The atttack is comprrised of two phases.
p
The first phase invvolves
establishing a man in the middle condition th
hrough the use of a hostile access po
oint known as
a the
pineapplee. The second
d phase of thee attack is to issue
i
a comm
mand to initiatte a remote device
d
wipe.
PHASE 1: MAN IN THE MIDDLE
Achievingg MitM for th
he attack
A man in the middle (MitM) attackk involves inteercepting thee flow of com
mmunicationss between deevices.
In order to
t pose as the
e Exchange seerver we neeeded to estab
blish a MitM connection
c
ass described above.
In this insstance we achieved this th
hrough the use
u of a Wi‐Fii Pineapple. The
T Wi‐Fi pin
neapple is a device
d
that listen
ns for beacon
ns sent by pro
ospective Wi‐Fi clients seaarching for reemembered access
a
pointss on a
network. Once receiptt of these pro
obes the inteerdicting deviice broadcastts an SSID invviting the clieent to
connect to
t it. This soliicits connectiions from anyy device thatt has an inseccure Wi‐Fi neetwork saved in its
configurattion (Sood an
nd Enbody 20
012). Figure 1 gives an ovverview of the typical com
mmunication paths
for mobilee ActiveSync clients that are not under attack.

Figu
ure 1: The flow of
o data between an Exchange Seerver and Mobilee / Web Clients
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Once the device is enssnared by thee interdicting device (in this case the Wi‐Fi
W pineapplle), the next phase
p
is to provvide fake DNSS responses and
a accept connections
c
intended for an Exchange server (Figure 2).
This outco
ome was achieved througgh the use of custom Python scripts run
nning on an auxiliary
a
computer
listening and
a responding to DNS reequests. It is at
a this point that
t
potential certificate issues may arrise. It
is expecteed that a devvice would en
nsure that seccure socket laayer (SSL) cerrtificates are valid, having been
signed by a root certifiicate authoritty (CA), and valid
v
in terms of the certificcate’s commo
on name mattching
the server address being representted. Based on the results of this verifiication proceess, the devicce will
either con
nnect, or not connect depeending on how SSL is hand
dled.

Figure 2: The mobile clien
nt communicatin
ng with the attacker

It is at thiss point that the certificatee issue comess up it is expeccted that a deevice would ensure
e
SSL
certificatees are valid, having
h
been signed by a root Certificatee Authority an
nd valid in terrms of the address
being represented, this has been teested. Based on
o the resultss above the device will eith
her connect, or
ng on how SSLL is handled.
not conneect, dependin
PHASE 2: INITIATING THE
T WIPE
The vast majority of Exchange mail protocolss and mobilee device deployments maake use of SSL
S to
implemen
nt some level of security. In order to successfully accept the connection fro
om the devicce we
need to negotiate
n
an SSL handshakke with the server.
s
It is asssumed that we do not possess
p
the private
key for th
he Exchange server
s
to whiich our victim
m is attemptin
ng a connection. As such we will be making
m
use of a self‐signed certificate to accomplish the
t attack. Seelf‐signed certificates can
n be generateed by
anyone, and
a without having
h
to und
dergo any kind of verification process that is normally associated
d with
a trusted root signed certificate. The details of
o the certificates do nott need to match those of
o the
intended legitimate servers.
s
This is significan
nt because the
t
lack of verification of the certificate
completely bypasses th
he authenticaation purposee for which ceertificates aree intended.
The issue allows for ce
ertain phones to be remo
otely wiped assuming
a
a MiTM
M
attack can
c be achievved. It
should bee noted that at
a no time is the
t Exchangee server required to be parrt of the convversation, how
wever
it does no
ot need to be excluded eith
her.
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Issuing Remote Wipe
With the device connected it is a simple process to issue a remote wipe of that device, on any
connection from an email client when an HTTP 449 error is sent. The 449 error demands the remote
device issue a PROVISION request prior to continuing communication, this is shown in figure 3
(Microsoft 2008). When the device makes a PROVISION request (essentially requesting new policy) we
respond with a policy command initiating a remote wipe of the device, this command is shown in Figure
4.
HTTP/1.1 449 Retry after sending a PROVISION command
Cache‐Control: private
Content‐Type: text/html
Server: Microsoft‐IIS/7.5
MS‐Server‐ActiveSync: 14.0
X‐AspNet‐Version: 2.0.50727
X‐Powered‐By: ASP.NET
Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 07:08:22 GMT
Content‐Length: 54
The custom error module does not recognize this error.
Figure 3 – The HTTP Error 449

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache‐Control: private
Content‐Type: application/vnd.ms‐sync.wbxml
Server: Microsoft‐IIS/7.5
MS‐Server‐ActiveSync: 14.0
Date: Tue, 08 May 2012 07:00:04 GMT
Content‐Length: 123
..j...EK.1..FGH.MS‐EAS‐Provisioning‐WBXML..K.1..I.
2761868790..JMN.0..O.0..Q.0..P.0..S.1..T.4..U.900.
.V.8...X.1...Z.0.......
Figure 4 – The Wipe Command

Impacted Devices
In testing we evaluated Android, iOS & Windows Phone 7.5. We set up two legitimate Exchange servers,
both running Exchange Server 2010. The first server made use of an expired self‐signed certificate, the
second made use of a certificate signed by a valid CA. The attack was then conducted to issue remote
wipe commands with a third, self‐signed certificate.
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Tested Device
Android (2.3 &
4.0)
iPhone/iPad
(iOS 6.0.1)
Windows Phone
7.5

Self‐Signed
Cert
Wipe, no
prompt
Wipe, cert
prompt
No wipe (err)

Trusted Cert
No wipe (err)
Wipe, cert
prompt
No wipe (err)

Table 1 ‐ Table of devices tested against the ActiveSync SSL exploit, as tested with self‐signed and trusted certificates

From the results above, clients of Exchange servers making use of self‐signed certificates (our research
indicates this is the most common deployment style for small to medium businesses) are most
vulnerable to this form of attack. Any handsets that participate in Microsoft Exchange systems
configured in such a way are subject to; remote wipe without prompt for Android handhelds; and with a
certificate error prompt for Apple iOS devices. In the case of Apple iOS devices, the prompt displayed
was for a certificate error, providing no information about this error, but with a clearly available
"continue" button. Windows Phone 7.5 provided no mechanism to easily accept a self‐signed certificate:
it had to be installed manually onto the device. Even when the certificate was changed by manual
methods there was no easy mechanism to accept the new certificate. This indicates high resilience to
this attack.
The clients of Exchange servers that were using certificates signed by a Trusted Certificate Authority
fared somewhat better, with Android & Windows Phone devices simply refusing to connect to the
service. Android devices displayed a security error, whilst Windows phone displayed a certificate error.
There was no mechanism provided to continue connecting regardless in either case. The iOS devices
tested provided a prompt to accept the new certificate, again with no advice and an easily available
continue button.
Discussion
As previously highlighted in the introduction of this paper, the use of Smartphone’s for both private and
commercial use has significantly increased over the last five years. In particular, corporate users of these
devices have moved away from what is arguably a secure device in the Blackberry, to more vulnerable
platforms in Android and iOS devices (Plotkin 2011). These devices contain functionality to automatically
synchronise email from corporate servers to these mobile devices, which are both logically and
physically vulnerable. They are logically vulnerable in that this type of attack is easy to perpetrate
against an unsuspecting user, and physically in that it can be easy to obtain local access to the device.
The attack described in this paper highlights this fragility, in that a user operating a Smart phone within
reasonable parameters, could still find them with a compromised phone. At this stage, whilst the attack
simply wipes the phone, the vulnerability will be further explored to determine whether data can be
stolen from a target device. The impact of having ones Smartphone wiped could range from mild
annoyance, where there is strictly corporate data involved, through to potentially life threatening if the
device in question was being used in a hospital or other medical facility. Although the attack process
detailed in this paper ultimately results in the victim’s device being factory reset, the attack could have
more significant ramifications. Once the PROVISION notice is sent by the client, the attacker has access
to the entire supported ActiveSync policy set to engage with the client (Microsoft 2008). This could
involve specifying to the client that the destination Exchange server has changed to a server address the
attacker operates, providing persistent control of the device.
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An additional complication is the increasing prevalence of bring your own device (BYOD) in the
corporate workspace (James and Griffiths 2012). It is feasible that an organisation could put steps and
measures in place to reduce the level of risk associated with corporate use of Smartphones, but it may
not always be possible to implement controls on a device for which administrator access is not available.
Strong policy measures combined with appropriately resourced seat education awareness and training
programs need to be implemented around the use of BYOD, as loss of corporate data on an employee’s
inadequately protected device could occur.
CONCLUSION
Mobile devices have been deployed widely in corporate environments, with a large number of these
being connected to corporate Exchange servers. It has been determined that the most commonly
implemented configuration of these servers leaves devices, and by extension a corporation, open to
compromise. The vulnerability is primarily due to the way that SSL is implemented on the tested
smartphone devices, without proper authentication or by simply allowing users to accept an invalid SSL
certificate, bypassing the security which should prevent the attack. It is shown that using certificates,
issued by trusted CAs, in some cases can mitigate the vulnerability, but this was not true for iOS. It is
concluded that such actions should not be available to the end user. The responsibility for the
vulnerability lies with the OS manufacturers, and therefore responsibility for correcting this vulnerability
also lies with these developers to ensure correct implementations of certificate validation occurs. In the
interim, use of appropriate security policy and user education should be employed as risk treatments.
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